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Summary: Public Sector Wage Premium Trends in Italy: 1995 – 2010 
This paper analyses the evolution of the public sector wage premium in Italy in 
the 1995-2010 period. OLS and quantile regressions are used to decompose time 
variations of the premium into characteristics and rewards a la Oaxaca. We show, 
first, that the well-documented rise of raw public-private wage differentials in the 
last decade was the result of increased gaps only at top deciles. Second, that, 
contrary to common beliefs, public versus private net premia did not 
fundamentally change over time, so that rising public-private raw differentials 
were due for the most part to changes in the mix of characteristics (especially 
occupations) across sectors and time. Third, that the long-term net premium is 
essentially zero at top percentiles and for males - with small fluctuations over time 
reflecting specific public policies and cycle features –, and decreasing at bottom 
and middle deciles. This implies a lower dispersion of public wages over time and 
a less compressed public wage structure. (J.E.L. J31, J45, C14). 
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 1. Introduction 
After being off the agenda of labour economics for a decade, in the last 
few years the literature on public-private wage differentials has received a 
renewed attention. One reason is that the wage setting of the public sector can 
delay or spur labour market adjustments in the overall economy, as the 2008 
financial crisis has shown for countries like Spain or Greece. In the fallout of the 
crisis, most Eurozone countries are considering fiscal consolidation plans, which 
hinge heavily on the wage bill of the public sector because the size of public pay 
has important consequences for both monetary and fiscal policies, and for the 
efficiency of the entire economic system. 
This paper uses micro-data to analyse differences between public and 
private wages in Italy in the 1995-2010 period, which incorporates years before 
and after the Euro introduction. Italy is an interesting country for the analysis of 
sector pay differentials since ‘excessively’ high public wages are considered 
partly responsible for the ongoing public debt crisis, started at the beginning of the 
‘90s and worsened in more recent years. The common perception is that in the last 
two decades public workers received disproportionately high wages, without any 
change in their efficiency or productivity. In recent years, budget laws included 
specific norms aimed at putting public wages’ growth under control, but their 
effectiveness has been often questioned. 
These considerations raise a number of questions. First, whether and to 
what extent public wages are higher than private ones and how these differences 
evolved over time. Second, what are the driving forces behind the differential in 
hourly earnings received by workers in the two sectors, after controlling for their 
characteristics.  
To this purpose, we estimate the evolution of the public pay premium both 
at the mean by OLS and at various percentiles of the wage distribution, year by 
year and separately for males and females. The distribution of wages in the two 
sectors and of the associated pay differential was analysed first by Lucifora - 
Meurs (2006) who investigate the structure of the public wage premium by gender 
and its variability at different points of the earnings distribution. However, their 
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analysis is based on a single cross-section of data and there is no evidence on how 
these differences evolved over time. Naticchioni - Ricci (2012) investigate the 
changes in the wage distribution between 1993 and 2004, but only within the 
public sector, without taking into account what this has implied in terms of 
relative public-private wages and without any reference to gender issues. In this 
respect, our paper aims at bringing together these two separate but complementary 
pieces of evidence on public and private wages in Italy and to look at the extent to 
which the structure of the public-private wage differential and its determinants has 
evolved in the last two decades. 
At the descriptive level, our analysis shows that Italy in the 1995-2010 
period was interested by a deep reallocation of labour income not only within the 
public sector, as suggested by Naticchioni - Ricci (2012), but also between 
sectors: while in the mid 90s the raw premium was higher for public employees at 
the bottom of the wage distribution, by 2010 those who are paid relatively more in 
the public sector are in the upper part of the wage distribution.  
Such increase in the average public-private wage differential was for the 
most part due to changes in observed characteristics and not to modifications in 
the return paid to these characteristics in the two sectors: the ‘net’ premium 
decreased in the pre-Euro period and then increased after year 2000, but to a much 
lesser extent than the unconditional differential. The analysis of the net pay 
premium shows that between 1995 and 2010 public and private pay structures 
became more similar, and public sector wages are now less compressed than in 
the mid ‘90s, even at bottom deciles, especially for males and also, but to a lesser 
extent, for females. 
The paper is organised as follows. Main features of the Italian public 
sector in the last two decades are described in Section 2. Section 3 contains a 
review of the empirical literature, with a focus on Italy. In Section 4 we present 
the data and  some preliminary evidence on the evolution of wages in public and 
private sector. Section 5 discusses the econometric strategy and the main results. 
Conclusions follow in Section 6. 
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2. The public sector in Italy: recent reforms 
At the beginning of the ‘90s, Italy introduced significant reforms in the 
public sector, aimed at putting inflation under control and imposing a more 
stringent budget constraint on public employment expenditures. On the pay side, 
since 1993 for the majority of public employees (see below) wages are bargained 
instead of settled by law. This so-called “privatisation” of wages was intended to 
subtract their determination from political pressures, and to make them more 
comparable to private sector ones. On the employment side, several norms were 
introduced to limit the number of new hiring of workers in the public sector, 
especially on a permanent basis. 
The wage determination system introduced in 1993 has two stages, and it 
is similar to that of the private sector. The first stage is centralised, and settles the 
contractual earnings (retribuzioni contrattuali), which incorporates a fixed 
amount and a variable component, which, in principle, should be related to the 
overall improvements of public sector productivity.2 
There is then a second stage of negotiations at the level of single 
Administrations, which can integrate the wages negotiated at the central level 
through additional components (retribuzione aggiuntiva). The financial resources 
needed for these ‘wage drifts’ are taken directly from the Administration budget. 
The outcome of this second stage is the actual compensation of employees 
(retribuzioni di fatto). The economic part of the contract lasts two years. The 
implementation of the 1993 new industrial relations regime was rather progressive 
and applied only to new contracts. 
Given this framework, the control of the government on the growth of 
public wages rests on two pillars: first, that contract renewals are not delayed. 
Second, that the growth of wages incorporated into the new contracts reflects only 
expected target inflation and a partial recovering of the difference between 
                                                 
2
 Public sector pay negotiations at the central level cover eight functional sub-sectors defined and 
involves an independent agency (Agenzia per la RAppresentaNza sindacale nel pubblico impiego - 
ARAN) which negotiates wages for the majority of public sector employees. The police and armed 
forces, university professors and other academic staff, judges and prosecutors, as well as senior 
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realised and target inflation in the previous two years. However, new contracts 
were signed on average two years after their expiring. In most cases, workers 
were ‘compensated’ for this delay by contract-specific additional wage 
component.  
A second reform was introduced in 1998, within the national collective 
agreement valid for the 1997-2001 period, by creating a number of intermediate 
additional sub-grades in the existing classification of jobs and occupations. The 
main novelty was that these intermediate positions were not subject to external 
competition for promotions. Instead, within intermediate levels, the criteria for 
promotions (based on education levels, seniority, productivity, etc.) were 
explicitly specified in national contracts. More importantly, additional specific 
criteria could be added at the level of single administrations (see Naticchioni - 
Ricci, 2012).  
On the one hand, the introduction of sub-grades and the related mechanism 
of internal promotions stimulated a higher heterogeneity of wage increases across 
public employees with similar individual characteristics. On the other hand, the 
main problem was that, especially until the mid 2000’s, local Administrations 
used promotions and other degrees of freedom in human resource policies to cheat 
the constraints on wage growth imposed by the central government and to drive 
earnings above inflation. This casts some doubts that the reformed wage setting 
regime was able to meet the wage moderation targets alone. 
At the cross-country level, OECD data on total compensations per 
employee (current values) over the 1995-2008 period show that Germany 
experienced a similar wage growth rate in public and private sectors, and, as a 
result, the wage premium of public employees was constant at the 10 percent 
level.3 In the French case there was no significant wage premium. The fact that 
                                                                                                                                     
civil servants are excluded from these negotiations and still have the wage settled by law, with an 
automatic economic progressions based on seniority. 
3
 The data are taken from the OECD database (www.stats.oecd.org) and refer to the Harmonised 
National accounts (ESA95). According to the National Accounts definition, the total compensation 
includes earnings and the social security contributions paid by the employer. We use this measure 
instead of wages because of its higher homogeneity across countries. For Italy, since since social 
security contributions are similar in the two sectors and were stable in the observed period, the 
evolution of gross wages is very similar to that of total compensations. Notice that these are simple 
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both in France and in Germany the wages in the two sectors moved in parallel 
reflects the structure of wage negotiations, where the results obtained by the larger 
unions (in general private sector unions) are taken as a benchmark for the other 
sector. In France, the system of industrial relations is centralised in both sectors 
and, not surprisingly, wages tend to be similar. Italy lacks of any application of 
this comparability principle and the result is that public sector total annual 
compensations per employee increased more than private ones.4 Between 1995 
and 2008 the total compensation per employee in the public sector rose from 
about 28,000 € to 47,000 €, with a 62% overall increase (3.5% on a year basis); 
these values are higher than inflation, and increased by 45% in the whole period 
(on average, 2.3% each year). 
On the employment side, in Italy public employees are still generally 
recruited through open, competitive examinations and, once hired, they enjoy life-
time contracts in which seniority still plays a major role for wage progression. 
Recruitment policies in the public sector have changed slightly after 1992. In 
particular, the introduction of a stricter budget discipline induced the government 
to ‘block the turnover’ in the public sector by narrowing the possibility of many 
Administrations to hire new workers on a permanent basis (see Dell’Aringa et al., 
2007). This resulted into a more experienced and, potentially, more costly 
workforce in the public sector. 
Also the effectiveness of these interventions has often been questioned. 
For example, while it is true that between 2001 and 2005 there was a reduction of 
labour units in the public sector (-2%), many Administrations were excluded by 
the block (Health, Armed Forces, University) and there were several additional 
exemptions for specific ones (especially Local Units). Overall, it is generally 
                                                                                                                                     
(i.e. un-weighted) means and have been obtained simply dividing the total amount of 
compensations by the number of employees in the two sectors. Hence their evolution may also 
partly reflect a change in the composition of employees by sub-sectors, industries and occupations, 
as well as of income tax rates and working hours. 
4
 This does not exclude that wage negotiations in the public sector do not feed-back into the 
private sector: recent empirical results show that, although on the institutional side public sector 
negotiations may or may nor precede public sector negotiations, public wages have a signalling 
effect for private wages, especially at within-the-year frequencies (Pérez - Sánchez, 2010, Lamo et 
al., 2012).   
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agreed that not only the targets were never reached, but also that these policies 
were never effective in reducing the absolute number of public employees. 
 
3. Related literature 
Pioneered by Smith (1977), several studies analysed public-private wage 
differences for many countries. For the most part, they find that, on average, 
public sector workers earn more than private employees, even after controlling for 
a number of observable characteristics, such as age and education (see Bender, 
1998, for a review). Some studies have also addressed the issue of endogenous 
selection of workers in the two sectors using instrumental variable methods or 
endogenous switching models (among the others, see Hartog - Oosterbeek, 1993, 
van Ophem, 1993, for Netherlands; Belman - Heywood, 1989, Borjas, 2002, for 
the US; Disney - Gosling, 1998, for the UK; Adamchick - Bedi, 2000, for Poland; 
Dustmann - Van Soest, 1998, for Germany). In general, results depend a lot on the 
model’s specification and estimates are very sensible to the instrument used and 
the year considered (Nawata - Nagase, 1996).5  
To overcome these limitations, few recent papers went beyond cross 
section estimates and use panel data, by either structural estimates of sector 
choices and wage dynamics (see Postel-Vinay - Turon, 2007, for Britain) or fixed 
effects models (Disney - Gosling, 1998, 2003, for UK; Bargain - Melly, 2008, for 
France). 
The main disadvantage of these models is that identification is ensured by 
‘movers’, i.e. workers that change sector of employment. Unfortunately, in Italy 
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 These features considerably complicate the possibility to use instrumental variables methods or 
selection correction models to consistently estimate the evolution of the public premium over time. 
In a preliminary stage, we experimented by estimating a model with an (endogenous) dummy for 
public employment either with IV and Heckman methods, under alternative identification 
strategies. The first instrument used to identify endogenous sector was whether the father or the 
mother was a civil servant; second, we exploit exogenous variations in the probability of joining 
the public sector induced by “block of turnover” policies – restrictions in the possibility to hire on 
a permanent basis - in the public sector in the ‘90s. Overall, in our case IVs or Heckman correction 
models – one for each year – produced very unstable estimates of the premium over time, and this 
was mainly driven by the different impact of the set of exclusion restrictions on sector choices 
from year to year. For this reason, we abstract from issues related to endogenous sector selection. 
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only few workers move across public and private sectors during their career. As a 
result, fixed effect models would require a long and large panel of individual job 
histories, which is currently not available for Italy. 
Given these limitations, our results are more descriptive and based on 
simple OLS and quantile regressions.6 The use of quantile regressions is 
particularly useful since because of more ‘egualitarian’ pay policies and higher 
centralisation of bargaining procedures in the public sector, in most countries the 
public sector wage distribution is more compressed, so that the State pays a higher 
net premium to the workers (especially males) at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, and a smaller or even a negative premium at the top (especially for 
females).7 
About Italy, the evidence is far from being conclusive and typically based 
on a single cross-section. In general, results indicate a relatively large raw positive 
wage differential in favour of public workers, which becomes moderate for males 
(9-12 percent) and higher for females (17-22 percent) once controlling for a 
number of individual characteristics (Bardasi, 1996; Brunello - Rizzi, 1993; 
Brunello - Dustmann, 1997; Dell’Aringa et al., 2007; Lucifora, 1999; Lucifora - 
Meurs, 2006; Ghinetti - Lucifora, 2012). Controlling for endogenous sector 
choices produces estimates that are in general less robust across specifications and 
sensitive to identification assumptions.8 Results from decomposition methods 
show that the largest share of raw differentials can be attributed to differences in 
observable characteristics of workers, whilst the part due to differences in returns 
is rather small, especially for males.  
                                                 
6
 Since the emphasis of the paper is on the evolution of the public wage gap rather than on the 
causal estimation of the pay gap, we believe that sample selection problems are of less concern 
here: To the extent which endogenous sector selection mechanisms are constant over time, they 
may affect the level of the average public wage gap, but not the pattern of its time variation.  
7
 Studies of public wage gaps based on quantile regressions include Poterba - Rueben (1995) for 
the US, Mueller (1998) for Canada, Disney - Gosling (1998) for UK, Melly (2005) for Germany, 
Bargain - Melly (2008) for France. Lucifora - Meurs (2006) provide a comparative analysis of UK, 
Italy and France. 
8
 Cappellari (2002) takes an alternative route to the approach based on static differences in 
earnings between the two sectors and investigates the dynamic of earnings. He finds that life cycle 
considerations matter in the formation of the differential; in the private sector careers are less 
stable and the growth rate of wages is more volatile that in the public sector, where wages are 
more homogeneous over the life. 
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A key point is that both the premium and its share explained by returns and 
characteristics may vary over the wage distribution. For Italy, this issue was 
addressed first by Comi - Ghinetti (2002) and Lucifora - Meurs (2006), who, 
using Bank of Italy SHIW data for 1998 and quantile regressions, both show that 
the public-private wage differential is sensitive to the choice of quantile, which 
rejects the hypothesis of a constant wage differential implied by previous studies 
based on OLS methods (see also Ghinetti - Lucifora, 2013, for a similar approach 
applied to ECHP – European Comminity Household Panel - data). Using a model 
based on single wage equation with a public sector dummy, in the lower part of 
the distribution the net public premium is higher (17 percent in a model without 
occupation dummies; 11 percent with a specification which includes them) than in 
the upper part (6 percent and zero, respectively). The effects are more pronounced 
for females, who are better off in the public sector at the lowest deciles, whilst the 
opposite is true for men at the highest deciles.  
Using the more flexible specification with separate wage equations by 
sector and an Oaxaca-Ransom type decomposition applied at each decile, 
Lucifora - Meurs (2006) also shows that the portion of the premium explained by 
observed characteristics is substantial (over 60 percent on average) and increasing 
over the wage distribution. Symmetrically, the part due to differences in returns 
between public and private sector (the ‘net’ premium) is about 8 percent at the 
lowest decile, but it monotonically decreases and becomes close to zero at the 
highest one, suggesting that differences in observed characteristics are more 
important at higher quantiles. 
In a recent paper, Naticchioni - Ricci (2012) analyse wage dynamics in the 
public sector, and relate these tendencies to the institutional reforms occurred in 
the public sector (see Section 2). Using Bank of Italy data for 1993 and 2004, they 
find that in the period considered there were no significant changes in the lower 
half of the distribution of public wages. The 75th percentile raised by 2.7 percent, 
but the more substantial upward shifts was at the top of the distribution (11 
percent at the 90th percentile). As a result, the 90th/10th ratio increased by 11 
percent between 1993 and 2004. They also perform a trivariate decomposition of 
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the changes in wage quantiles.9 The effect of coefficients was negligible at all 
deciles, and the share explained by characteristics was roughly constant (about 3 
percent at each level), suggesting  that the increase of endowments of public 
employees shifted upwards the whole wage distribution. The only decomposition 
component which had a different impact on lower and upper quantiles is the 
residual (within group dispersion), which explains 8 percent of the 11 percent 
change at the 90th percentile, and -3.2 percent at the -0.6 percent overall change of 
the 10th percentile. 
Hence, increased residual ‘unexplained’ within group wage dispersion in 
the public sector was the main responsible for the change of public wages in the 
90th percentile and of increased inequality (90th/10th). According to the authors, 
the reason is that, while average wages in the 1993-2004 did not change much 
except at higher deciles, wage dispersion in the public sector increased especially 
among the managers and the white collars, who are more likely to be found in the 
90th percentile. Naticchioni - Ricci (2012) suggest that this might be the result of 
the reformed institutional framework in the public sector, and in particular that 
since 1998 similar employees might be paid differently in different administrative 
units, and this possibility is available especially to white collars and high level 
occupations.  
We complement and extend the analysis of Naticchioni - Ricci (2012) by 
looking at what these trends in public wages - matched with the corresponding 
ones in private wages - imply for the evolution of wage differentials between the 
two sectors in the last fifteen years, and by considering gender issues.  
 
                                                 
9
 In the tradition of the Oaxaca decomposition, the residual component can be computed from a 
threefold decomposition of wage changes between two groups or two points in time, which 
distinguished between effects of coefficients (evaluated at characteristics of, say, the initial year), 
covariates (evaluated at coefficients of the final year) and a residual part due to the interaction of 
simultaneous changes of coefficients and covariates over time. Given the difficulty to implement 
the threefold decomposition in the context of quantile regressions, in our analysis we will use the 
standard twofold decomposition approach, which distinguishes only between the ‘explained’ 
(characteristics) and ‘unexplained’ effects (coefficients plus potential effects of differences in 
unobserved variables, see Section 5). 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use data drawn by the 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 
2010 waves of the Bank of Italy’s  Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW). Run since 1977, each survey year covers approximately 8,000 
households, corresponding to around 20,000 individuals and 14,000 labour 
income earners. In the first waves, each time there was a new draw of individuals 
from the population. Since a panel component was added in 1987, each wave 
contains both ‘old’ and ‘new’ individuals.  
For the purposes of the present study, we treat the data as a repeated cross-
section, thus not considering its longitudinal dimension: the panel component is 
relatively small especially at the beginning of the period, and only in recent waves 
it reached half of the overall sample. Restricting the analysis to either the balanced 
or unbalanced panel would therefore limit the empirical analysis to a relatively 
small number of observations. This would imply that to track the evolution of the 
public wage premium over time we needed to estimate public and private wage 
equations separately for each year of data, and this requires a large sample of 
possibly constant size for each cross-section. Moreover, limiting the analysis to 
the panel dimension is not justified even on methodological grounds, since we use 
cross-sectional estimators on repeated samples and not panel data models. 
The construction of the sample used in the empirical investigation follows 
the criteria used by many studies reviewed in Section 3. We restrict the analysis  
to employees who work in the non-agricultural sector and are in the age interval 
15-65, who represents the typical male employee in the private and public 
sectors.10 These selection criteria produce cross-sectional samples which goes 
from a minimum of about 5,400 units (year 1998) to a maximum of about 5,700 
(year 2000). The pooled final sample includes approximately 44,000 observations. 
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 Main excluded categories: retired, unemployed, self-employed and students. We experimented 
with alternative sample selection rules, to make more comparable ex ante public and private 
workers in terms of their age. We used ranges such as 20-65 and 20-60 to account for the fact that 
to be hired in the private sector typically at least an high school diploma is needed and that the 
retirement age is lower than in the private sector. Results were in line with those presented in the 
paper. 
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The SHIW provides a measure of annual earnings inclusive of extra-time 
compensations and fringe benefits, and net of taxes and social security 
contributions.11 Additional information is on the average number of hours worked 
per week and on the number of months worked per year. Based on that, we follow 
most empirical studies and construct an estimate of hourly net wages (inclusive of 
fringe benefits), which is obtained dividing annual earnings by months worked 
plus number of average weekly hours plus 52/12 (which is an estimate of the 
number of weeks worked per month).12 
Public employees have been identified by combining information from 
two survey’s questions: the first asks to report the employment sector among a set 
of alternatives, that includes ‘Public Administration, Defense, Education, Health, 
Public Services’; the second is the variable “firm size”, which classifies public 
employees in a specific category and thus allows to exclude private workers 
employed in Education and Health. Sector affiliation is captured by a dummy 
which equals one for public workers. 
The educational structure is summarised by a set of dummies for the 
highest completed schooling level being: primary or less, low secondary, high 
secondary, university (both three years university diploma and four/five years BA 
degrees, as well as the few cases of postgraduate qualifications), respectively. 
About other variables, we use standard controls used in human capital equations 
such as time dummies (whenever needed), a rather disaggregated set of age 
dummies, a marital status and a gender dummy, controls for the geographical area 
of residence and a set of occupation dummies. 
A description of the variables used in the empirical analysis and summary 
statistics are given in Table 1 on the pooled sample, and for the first and the last 
available year. The share of public employees dropped from 37 percent in 1995 to 
25 percent in more recent years, probably as a result of hiring restrictions and of 
the privatisation of many formerly Public Services. As expected, females are more 
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 We also experimented with wages net of fringe benefits and non-monetary compensations, but 
the results were basically the same as those reported in Section 6. 
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represented in the public sector. For similar reasons, the public sector employs the 
highest fraction of workers with both a university and a high secondary school 
degree. 
(Table 1 here) 
Unsurprisingly, public employees are on average older and more 
concentrated in the South of Italy. As a result of the lengthening of education and 
of the difficulty of youths to access the labour market, as well as of the social 
security reforms that have increased de facto the retirement age, our sample gets 
increasingly older in more recent waves. This phenomena is more evident in the 
public sector, possibly as a result of the previously discussed turnover block. 
Public administrations are well represented in the whole Italian territory, while the 
largest share of private employees is concentrated in the Centre-North. Since the 
public sector pays similar wages over the whole territory for comparable 
occupations, the public wage premium varies a lot across geographical areas (see 
Dell’Aringa et al., 2007). 
Table 1 also shows that average hourly wages are higher in the public 
sector, especially for females. There are deep differences in the occupational 
structure both across genders and sectors. First, blue collars are strongly over-
represented in the private sector This difference has obvious consequences for the 
distribution of wages in the two sectors. 
Second, there are substantial gender differences in the sector distribution 
of occupations: females are in general over-represented in non-manual works and 
under-represented in high skill jobs. The exception is represented by intermediate 
occupations, which in our case include teachers. For all of these reasons, 
particular care will be given to the treatment of gender differences and the effect 
of the distribution of occupations across gender and sectors in the empirical 
analysis. 
                                                                                                                                     
12
 Real wages are expressed in 2010€ using the consumer price index to deflate nominal values. To 
avoid extreme and unusual values, for each year we excluded observations falling in the top and 
bottom 0.5 percent of the wage distribution.  
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The key features of the distribution (mean, median, 10th and 90th percentile) 
of public and private net hourly wages obtained from individual level SHIW data 
are plotted in Figure 1, for the whole sample and separately by gender. 
Public wages were rising by the middle to the end of the ‘90s, then 
decreased in the years just before the euro introduction, probably as a result of  
fiscal rigor and stringent budget policies (also at the level of single public 
administrations) to meet the Euro criteria, and then increased again until 2006, to 
compensate for the previous loss in purchasing power. After that, they decreased 
again until 2008. The dynamic of average private wages is somehow different: the 
rate of growth was higher until 2000 and there is no evidence of declining wages 
before the Euro introduction. In the last decade, wages were stable until 2004. 
Afterwards, public and private wages moved in parallel.  
In general, wage dynamics in the two sectors were similar in the central part 
(median) of the distribution - especially for males -, but very  different in the 
upper and lower parts: at the 10th percentile, public wages were stable or even 
declining. The opposite occurred in the upper part of the distribution (90th 
percentile). This result is consistent also with the evidence presented by 
Naticchioni - Ricci (2012). 
In the private sector, real hourly wages followed a rather stable pattern 
during the whole period considered. Both the reduction of wage differences in the 
lower percentiles and the increase in the upper ones are more pronounced for 
males. Overall, females experienced lower rates of wage growth in both sectors. 
 (Figure 1 here) 
What these wage dynamics imply for the evolution of the raw public-private 
wage differential is shown in Figure 2. From 1995 to 2000, the overall mean 
public premium decreased by almost 10 percentage points (from 32 to 24 
percent), and then increased again up to the 30 percent level. However, it never 
recovered its initial level. In general, the differential is higher for males than for 
females, and the post-2000 evolution of the premium for males is substantially 
flat, while it is steeper for females and back to the 1995 levels by the end of the 
period considered. 
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(Figure 2 here) 
Interestingly, the premium at the 10th percentile decreased from the initial 40 
percent level to the 30 percent of 2002. Until year 2000 the evolution of the 
premium at the 90th percentile was similar: it was initially equal to 34 percent, 
then it decreased until year 2000. Afterwards it increased sharply, moving up  to 
40 percent by 2010, which is a value higher than what is observed at the bottom 
and at the middle of the wage distribution in the same period.  
In Section 5 we analyse the extent to which the above results reflects 
genuine price effects or differences between sectors in workers and job attributes. 
 
5. Public-Private Wage Differences 
5.1. Empirical Approach 
Summary statistics showed that public and private sectors are very different in 
terms of individual and job characteristics. In order to capture these features we 
estimate separate earnings equations for public and private sectors. Results are 
used, first, to compute the unconditional public-private wage differential and to 
evaluate its statistical significance.13 Second, to decompose this differential a la 
Oaxaca into a part due to different characteristics of employees in the two sectors 
(the covariates effect) and a part attributable to differences in returns to given 
characteristics (the coefficients effect).  
The covariates effect captures that public and private sector workers have 
different observable characteristics in terms of education, age and gender 
composition, geographical distribution, occupation; and it is typically interpreted 
as the result of differences in recruitment and human resource management 
policies between sectors. Instead, the coefficients effect measures of the ‘true’ 
differential, i.e. the different prices that given characteristics receive in the two 
sectors. We refer to it as the ‘net’ public wage premium. 
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 Remember that the algebra of linear regressions and the law of iterated expectations imply that 
the predicted individual wages evaluated at the mean of observable characteristics gives the 
average sample wage. As a result, the total differential (average predicted public wages minus 
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We estimate public and private wage equations, first, by OLS and perform the 
associated standard decomposition, evaluated at the mean of observable 
characteristics (Oaxaca - Ramson, 1994). We then use quantile regressions to 
estimate sector-specific wage equations and the associated public wage premium 
at key percentiles of the distribution. At each percentile, we again use results to 
decompose the predicted unconditional differential into characteristics and 
returns, using a technique developed, among the others, by Melly (2005, 2006) 
which can be seen as a generalisation of the standard Oaxaca methodology.14 OLS 
and quantile results are obtained by pooling data for all the years and by running 
separate estimates for each year, on all individuals as well as separately by 
gender. 
We consider two specifications: the first (‘no occupations’) includes only 
standard controls for individual attributes such as education, age, gender, region 
of residence plus year dummies (whenever needed).15 In the second specification 
(‘yes occupations’) we add the set of occupation dummies to capture sector 
differences in work related characteristics and the skill requirement of jobs.16 
                                                                                                                                     
average predicted private wages) computed within the Oaxaca methodology is equal (except for 
rounding errors) to the raw (unadjusted) differential that can be computed directly from the data. 
14
 A complication with quantile regressions is that, differently to the OLS case for the mean, there 
is no guarantee that the estimated conditional quantile evaluated at the mean of characteristics (the 
Xs of a standard regression) is equal to the unconditional quantile because the law of iterated 
expectations does not applies to quantiles. The trick is to use the fact that the conditional 
(estimated) quantile function is the inverse of the conditional distribution of the outcome (log 
wages in the, say, public sector, in our case), i.e.  estimated conditional quantiles are a sufficient 
statistics to construct the inverse of the distribution of logW|X. The strategy to get the raw 
unconditional differential at different quantiles and to compute its decomposition is then to 
generate an estimate of a sufficient number of conditional quantiles. By their inversion, the 
conditional distribution function of logW(t) can be recovered. Then, the unconditional distribution 
function can be estimated by integrating the conditional distribution function over the range of the 
covariates. Finally, the unconditional distribution function can be inverted in order to obtain the 
unconditional quantiles of interest. See Machado - Mata (2005) and Melly (2005, 2006) for 
technical details, and Naticchioni - Ricci (2012) for additional insights. 
15
 As a robustness check, we also estimated the model with a richer specification which includes 
experience and its square as additional regressors, and even a more general one which also 
includes a set of dummies for the region of birth. Beside all the endogeneity issues associated with 
the inclusion of experience, we find that estimates are almost unchanged since the age variables as 
usual absorb also the effect of experience. Similarly, the addition of region of birth variables does 
not improve the quality of the estimates since, conditional of the region of residence, the 
associated coefficients are often poorly estimated. This is probably the result of the low internal 
mobility in Italy, which makes the two set of regional variables highly collinear. 
16
 Disney (2007) and Belman - Heywood (2004) highlighted that controlling for occupation in the 
context of public-private wage differences is crucial, otherwise the differences in occupational 
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Table A1 in the appendix shows the matrix of correlations between covariates. All 
the regressors are correlated, but not at levels that would induce multi-collinearity 
problems in the estimates.  
 
5.2. Main Findings 
Point estimates of the average differential, decomposition results and 
significance levels are in Table A2 in the appendix.17 Pooled OLS estimates show 
that the raw public-private wage differential was about 28.5 percent over the 
whole period, which is consistent with the finding of Lucifora - Meurs (2006) 
obtained using 1998 data. On average, included characteristics account for about 
half of the premium: public sector workers have on average better characteristics 
than their private counterparts so that the net gain (without occupational controls) 
is about 15 percent. Differences in the occupational structure matter for an 
additional 7-8 percent and in favour of public employees. Accordingly, the ‘net’ 
premium computed on the pooled sample is approximately 8 percent, in line again 
with the findings of Lucifora - Meurs (2006). 
Gender specific estimates produce the known finding that both the raw and 
the net overall premium is higher for women (12 percent) than for men (3.5 
percent). For both males and females, workers’ characteristics account for 20 
percent of the raw gap. The resulting larger public net premium for females 
confirms the usual perception that discrimination in the public sector is lower and 
that the State is a fairer employer. 
(Figure 3 here) 
The next step is to estimate the time evolution of the average public-private 
wage differential. Results are summarised in Figure 3, which plots both the raw 
and the ‘net’ premium (with and without occupation controls), i.e. the rewards’ 
effect in the Oaxaca decomposition. The difference (distance) between the raw 
and the net differential is a measure of the covariates effect. Looking at the full 
                                                                                                                                     
structures and in the skill mix across sectors would contaminate results, especially when estimates 
are replicated over time. 
17
 To save space, full estimates of the public and private wage equations are not reported but 
available from the authors. 
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specification (with occupational dummies), the portion of raw wage differences 
explained by characteristics of public workers increased over time, so that  the net 
average public pay premium is substantially flat in the period considered: given 
characteristics, the relative public versus private rewards for such characteristics 
did not change. This suggests that wage moderation policies in the public sector 
were probably effective to meet their targets. 
By converse, the increase of the raw premium after the Euro introduction was 
a compositional effect driven by a change in those observable characteristics of 
public employees which di per se are associated with higher wages. The 
comparison between the specifications with and without occupations shows that 
the share of the premium explained by individual characteristics (age, education, 
region, etc.) decreased over time, while an increasing share of the public wage 
premium was explained by the occupational structure. This is not surprising: as 
shown by Table 1, in the 1995-2010 period the occupational structure of public 
employees registered a reduction of manual workers (low wage earners) from 21 
to 12 percent, and an increase in the share of clerks from 46 to 52 percent. Also 
the private sector was interested by similar movements across occupations, but of 
smaller magnitude. Moreover, the share of public managers increase by 2.5 
percentage point and since they are among the high wage earners, this has obvious 
consequences also on the average public wage premium. 
One possibility is that this change in the composition of public employment 
was favoured by policies such as the privatisation of former public services (and 
of the associated workforce) and the constraints to hire employees on a permanent 
basis, which applied to many Public Administrations (see Section 2): for example, 
a constrained administration would probably keep the bulk of public workers with 
specific competencies (high skilled) and buy the services provided by the low 
skilled in the market, where close substitutes are available (school attendant, 
cleaning services, etc.). 
About gender differences, the net premium was roughly constant for 
males. For females, it declined from 20 percent in 1995 to 8 percent in 2000 and 
then it recovered up to 12 percent in the following years. 
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 Next, we analyse the evolution of the public wage gap at different point of 
the wage distributions. The quantiles considered are the 10th, the 25th, the 50th, the 
75th and the 90th. The main findings are summarised in Figure 4, which displays 
the evolution of raw and net differentials at key quantiles. 
Full results are in Table A3 in the appendix. For simplicity, the table 
reports only values for the specification with occupational dummies. Results for 
the pooled sample reveal a U-shaped raw differential, which is higher at the 
bottom (34.5 percent at the 10th percentile) and at the top (30.5 percent at the 90th 
percentile) of the wage distribution and lower at the median. The decomposition 
shows that, especially at top deciles, only a small part of the raw differential is 
due to differences in returns. As a result, the net public premium in Italy declines 
over the wage distribution, being 18 percent at the bottom and close to zero at the 
top. Similar results were obtained by Lucifora - Meurs (2006) using a single 
cross-section. At top deciles, the premium become negative for males and still 
positive (but insignificant) for females. 
 Figure 4 shows that the share of the total wage differential explained, 
respectively, by coefficients and characteristics was not constant over time. In 
particular, the net premium measured at the 10th percentile of public and private 
wages declined monotonically until 2006. The steeper profile of the net versus the 
raw differential suggests that an increasing share of differences between public 
and private wages was, again, explained by differences in characteristics of 
workers in the two sectors and not to price effects. 
The results for the median are qualitatively similar: the stable pattern of 
the raw differential hides a faster diminishing of the net gain for public 
employees, from 14 to 4 percent in the initial versus final year. In the upper part 
of the distribution, the upward trend of the raw differential at the 90th percentile 
observed in the post-2000 period was totally explained by an increase of the part 
due to better characteristics (especially occupations). 
(Figure 4 here) 
 Matched with the evidence of a zero-centred net gain at top deciles, the 
decreasing trends of the premium at bottom and middle portions of the wage 
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distribution imply a reduction of its dispersion. In other words, once we take into 
account the differences in the characteristics of workers in the two sectors, in the 
last fifteen years the structure of public and private wages became more similar, 
with a reduction of the premium at bottom and middle quantiles, and a 
convergence (at least until 2006) towards the values of top deciles, which are in 
general lower. As a result, the structure of public wages became less compressed. 
The picture is qualitatively similar for males and females: the drop of the 
premium at the 10th percentile was higher for males. Among females, the public 
premium at the 10th percentile fell until 2002, but then it started to increase again 
until the end of the period. However, also for females it is true that by the end of 
the period public wage premium across different percentiles were more similar 
and, on average, lower than at the beginning. Overall, at all the percentiles 
considered net differentials reached their minimum in the years around the Euro 
introduction. In the subsequent period they partially recovered, at least until 2006, 
but they were never back to the mid ‘90s levels.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we used micro-data for the 1995-2010 period to study the 
time evolution of the public-private wage differential in Italy. Its time evolution 
may reflect, first, the change of the prices paid in the two sectors to a constant set 
of individual and job characteristics. Second, a change of these characteristics 
keeping constant the rewards. We used decompositions based on OLS and 
quantile regressions to analyse these issues at different points of public and 
private wage distributions. 
The main results are, first, that the well-documented increase of the raw 
average public-private wage differential experienced in the last decade was due to 
a shift of the premium in the upper part of the wage distribution, which left 
unchanged relative wages at bottom and middle deciles.  
Second, such wage dynamics were driven for the most part by changes in 
the composition of the occupational structure of public versus private employees.  
While Naticchioni - Ricci (2012) showed that more favourable endowments of 
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public employees were uniformly distributed over the quantiles of the public 
wages distribution and therefore did not exert any significant impact on the 
evolution of wage inequality within the public sector, our findings suggest that in 
the public sector the higher availability of occupations associated with higher 
wages were key determinants of the rising wage differentials between public and 
private sectors. Once we control for compositional effects, the net average 
premium decreased from 11 percent in 1995 to 7-8 percent in 2000, and remained 
roughly constant since then, especially for males. On average, they earn an higher 
public pay premium than females, but gender differences reduced over time.  
Third, the compression of the public sector wage structure decreased 
substantially from 1995 to 2010, so that the net public premium at the 10th and 
50th percentile progressively converged to the (lower) values estimated at top 
deciles.  
From a policy perspective, the stability of the net premium and the 
reduction of its dispersion across wage deciles suggest that the reforms in the 
process of public wage setting that Italy introduced in the mid 90s for wage 
moderation purposes and to establish a convergence between public and private 
wages for workers with similar characteristics were at least party successful.  
By converse, the increased share of the premium explained by job 
characteristics, and especially by the occupational structure, may represent an 
unintended effect of reforms introduced in the public sector on the employment 
side, in particular those targeted at reducing the number of public employees by 
limiting the ability of many public administration to hire new workers on a 
permanent basis. Indeed, the more penalised were probably the manual and low 
skilled workers, who are more easily substitutable by similar private counterparts. 
Though other explanations are probably available, the fact that high-level and 
high-pay occupations are now over-represented in the public sector thus driving 
upwards relative public-private wages, goes in the direction of our ‘institutional’ 
interpretation, which, of course, cannot be directly tested. 
According to our explanation, the effectiveness of the turnover block policy 
would be obviously called into question: not only it is not clear whether it met its 
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targets in terms of reduction of public employees; but it might have also boosted 
public pays well above private ones, especially in recent years and in the upper 
part of the wage distribution. 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics (variables and means) 
 Pooled years  1995  2010 
Variables: Private Public  Private Public  Private Public 
Male 0.622 0.480  0.667 0.509  0.588 0.427 
Primary school degree or less 0.101 0.038  0.163 0.065  0.052 0.010 
Low secondary school degree 0.362 0.191  0.386 0.208  0.335 0.136 
High secondary school degree 0.453 0.485  0.406 0.482  0.494 0.478 
Tertiary education degree (1) 0.084 0.286  0.045 0.246  0.119 0.375 
Age 38.641 44.467  36.327 42.294  41.305 47.749 
Married 0.596 0.754  0.603 0.767  0.596 0.736 
North-West 0.270 0.216  0.282 0.209  0.239 0.237 
Noth-East 0.261 0.178  0.277 0.181  0.257 0.191 
Centre 0.215 0.222  0.210 0.210  0.218 0.213 
South 0.173 0.255  0.173 0.282  0.180 0.229 
Main Islands 0.080 0.129  0.058 0.118  0.105 0.129 
         
Males: 
        
Hourly wage (2) 9.033 11.549  8.378 11.017  9.213 12.258 
Hours worked (weekly) 40.885 36.802  42.144 36.465  39.832 36.888 
Manual 0.626 0.158  0.658 0.215  0.627 0.122 
Clerk 0.278 0.538  0.241 0.462  0.286 0.526 
Intermediate profession (3) 0.071 0.236  0.078 0.260  0.067 0.266 
Manager (4) 0.025 0.068  0.023 0.063  0.020 0.086 
         
Females: 
        
Hourly wage (2) 8.039 11.231  7.039 10.842  8.169 11.367 
Hours worked (weekly) 35.298 32.359  36.439 31.652  34.285 33.174 
Manual 0.480 0.108  0.563 0.119  0.488 0.109 
Clerk 0.435 0.401  0.384 0.362  0.449 0.393 
Intermediate profession (3) 0.077 0.467  0.051 0.507  0.055 0.452 
Manager (4) 0.007 0.024  0.002 0.012  0.008 0.046 
         
Share public sector workers 27.5%  37.7%  25.2% 
N. observations 36306 13779  3571 2163  3985 1340 
Note: (1) includes short-term university degrees (three years), standard university degree (four-five 
years) and postgraduate education (Master level, doctorate). (2) Wages are net of taxes and social 
contributions, and include all bonuses and premia received over the year, and are expressed in 
2010 euro. (3) includes professors of any school level, except university professors. (4) Managers 
include University professors and other high intellectual tasks. Geographical dummies (North-
west, etc.) refer to the area of residence. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 – Evolution of Public and Private Mean Hourly Wages in Italy - SHIW 
microdata 
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Figure 2 – Raw public-private wage differential (log wages) 
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Figure 3 – Public wage premium:  
OLS decomposition, raw and net premium (coefficients’ effect)  
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Figure 4 – Public wage premium: 
Quantile regression decomposition, raw and net premium (coefficients’ effect) 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Correlation matrix between covariates used in the empirical analysis 
 Male 
Primary 
 or less 
Low  
second. 
High  
second. 
Tertiary 
Edu. Age Married 
North- 
West 
Noth- 
East Centre South 
Main 
Isl. Manual Clerk 
Interm. 
prof. Manag. 
                 
Male 1.000                
Primary or 
less 0.066 1.000               
Low second. 0.127 -0.205 1.000              
High second. -0.088 -0.280 -0.628 1.000             
Tertiary educ. -0.096 -0.122 -0.273 -0.373 1.000            
Age 0.033 0.220 -0.050 -0.123 0.068 1.000           
Married 0.063 0.106 0.008 -0.069 0.004 0.475 1.000          
North-West -0.041 -0.017 0.007 -0.003 0.008 -0.013 -0.015 1.000         
Noth-East -0.045 -0.044 -0.014 0.055 -0.025 -0.078 -0.048 -0.328 1.000        
Centre -0.018 -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.017 -0.001 -0.308 -0.294 1.000       
South 0.085 0.055 -0.010 -0.032 0.016 0.061 0.053 -0.289 -0.276 -0.259 1.000      
Main Islands 0.038 0.023 0.023 -0.039 0.007 0.028 0.021 -0.189 -0.180 -0.169 -0.159 1.000     
Manual 0.166 0.282 0.421 -0.311 -0.342 -0.145 -0.087 -0.020 0.025 0.032 -0.024 -0.020 1.000    
Clerk -0.088 -0.182 -0.212 0.321 -0.031 -0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.021 0.004 0.015 -0.698 1.000   
Interm. prof. -0.141 -0.124 -0.252 0.021 0.406 0.156 0.083 0.005 -0.029 -0.015 0.035 0.007 -0.382 -0.325 1.000  
Manager 0.068 -0.048 -0.105 -0.049 0.249 0.123 0.066 0.029 -0.012 -0.003 -0.016 -0.002 -0.147 -0.125 -0.069 1.000 
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Table A2 – OLS estimates of the average public-private wage differential and decomposition (pooled sample and year by year) 
 Pooled 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
 Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. 
Whole sample 
Raw Different. 0.285 0.004 0.340 0.010 0.276 0.012 0.253 0.012 0.270 0.013 0.282 0.012 0.290 0.014 0.305 0.012 0.304 0.012 
Decomposition:                   
Without occupat                   
- Characteristics 0.138 0.003 0.171 0.010 0.155 0.009 0.152 0.009 0.134 0.009 0.128 0.008 0.146 0.009 0.127 0.009 0.135 0.009 
- Coefficients 0.147 0.004 0.169 0.012 0.121 0.012 0.101 0.012 0.136 0.013 0.154 0.012 0.144 0.014 0.178 0.013 0.169 0.013 
With occupation                   
- Characteristics 0.207 0.004 0.229 0.011 0.206 0.010 0.196 0.010 0.198 0.011 0.205 0.010 0.209 0.011 0.223 0.011 0.234 0.011 
- Coefficients 0.078 0.005 0.111 0.012 0.071 0.013 0.058 0.013 0.071 0.013 0.077 0.012 0.081 0.014 0.082 0.014 0.070 0.013 
Males 
Raw Different. 0.259 0.006 0.298 0.013 0.253 0.016 0.248 0.017 0.234 0.017 0.263 0.017 0.255 0.020 0.280 0.018 0.290 0.018 
Decomposition:                   
Without occupat                   
- Characteristics 0.152 0.004 0.183 0.012 0.142 0.012 0.163 0.012 0.146 0.012 0.146 0.012 0.163 0.013 0.150 0.012 0.164 0.012 
- Coefficients 0.107 0.006 0.115 0.013 0.111 0.015 0.084 0.016 0.087 0.017 0.117 0.017 0.092 0.019 0.130 0.017 0.126 0.018 
With occupation                   
Characteristics 0.214 0.005 0.239 0.013 0.199 0.013 0.208 0.013 0.205 0.014 0.206 0.014 0.227 0.015 0.222 0.014 0.252 0.015 
Coefficients 0.046 0.006 0.059 0.014 0.055 0.015 0.039 0.016 0.029 0.017 0.057 0.017 0.028 0.018 0.058 0.017 0.038 0.018 
Females 
Raw Different. 0.340 0.006 0.438 0.016 0.330 0.018 0.286 0.018 0.333 0.019 0.328 0.017 0.352 0.019 0.355 0.017 0.348 0.017 
Decomposition:                   
Without occupat                   
- Characteristics 0.143 0.005 0.184 0.020 0.186 0.015 0.156 0.014 0.140 0.015 0.134 0.012 0.158 0.014 0.125 0.013 0.131 0.013 
- Coefficients 0.197 0.007 0.254 0.023 0.145 0.021 0.129 0.020 0.193 0.021 0.194 0.018 0.194 0.020 0.230 0.019 0.216 0.018 
With occupation                   
- Characteristics 0.221 0.006 0.246 0.026 0.243 0.018 0.207 0.016 0.201 0.018 0.225 0.016 0.220 0.017 0.251 0.021 0.230 0.019 
- Coefficients 0.119 0.008 0.193 0.028 0.087 0.022 0.079 0.021 0.132 0.023 0.103 0.019 0.131 0.022 0.103 0.024 0.118 0.022 
Note: Estimates obtained with the Stata command ‘oaxaca’ and using the standard twofold Oaxaca decomposition: differences in coefficients are weighted at the mean of 
characteristics of public employees: differences in characteristics are evaluated using private sector coefficients as weights. As a result, the portion of the differential attributed 
to ‘Characteristics’ includes the pure endowment effect of public employees and a residual interaction term (differences across sectors in endowments and returns). Separate 
Public and private wage equations were estimated using the controls in Table 1, with and without occupation dummies depending on the specification adopted, plus a set time 
dummies in the case of the pooled model. Instead of the continuous variable age, we use a rather disaggregated set of age dummies: less tha 30 (omitted); 31-40, 41-50, 51-65. 
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Table A3 – Quantile regression estimates of the public-private wage differential at key percentiles and decomposition  
(pooled sample and year by year, model with occupation dummies) 
 All Males Females 
 Raw differential Decomposition: Raw differential Decomposition: Raw differential Decomposition: 
Quantile:   Characterist. Coefficients   Characterist. Coefficients   Characterist. Coefficients 
 Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. 
Pooled                   
0.1 0.345 0.008 0.166 0.006 0.180 0.010 0.332 0.009 0.162 0.012 0.170 0.018 0.376 0.008 0.189 0.010 0.187 0.014 
0.25 0.280 0.004 0.163 0.005 0.117 0.006 0.264 0.005 0.153 0.009 0.112 0.010 0.319 0.006 0.192 0.008 0.127 0.009 
0.5 0.258 0.004 0.186 0.004 0.072 0.005 0.230 0.005 0.163 0.006 0.067 0.006 0.315 0.007 0.232 0.007 0.083 0.005 
0.75 0.293 0.006 0.259 0.006 0.034 0.005 0.250 0.007 0.220 0.008 0.031 0.007 0.371 0.010 0.316 0.010 0.055 0.005 
0.9 0.305 0.009 0.308 0.009 -0.002 0.010 0.261 0.013 0.283 0.011 -0.022 0.014 0.385 0.010 0.361 0.010 0.024 0.010 
1995                   
0.1 0.421 0.015 0.131 0.016 0.290 0.023 0.402 0.024 0.123 0.018 0.280 0.024 0.468 0.027 0.185 0.020 0.283 0.034 
0.25 0.352 0.011 0.141 0.012 0.211 0.014 0.332 0.016 0.129 0.012 0.203 0.021 0.404 0.020 0.202 0.020 0.202 0.017 
0.5 0.307 0.012 0.168 0.010 0.140 0.011 0.265 0.017 0.139 0.014 0.126 0.018 0.403 0.020 0.264 0.020 0.139 0.014 
0.75 0.319 0.014 0.260 0.015 0.059 0.013 0.238 0.024 0.196 0.015 0.042 0.022 0.457 0.023 0.375 0.020 0.081 0.017 
0.9 0.336 0.020 0.343 0.024 -0.007 0.018 0.265 0.023 0.292 0.024 -0.027 0.028 0.496 0.036 0.469 0.022 0.027 0.027 
1998                   
0.1 0.358 0.017 0.149 0.020 0.209 0.024 0.341 0.022 0.173 0.033 0.168 0.046 0.391 0.023 0.176 0.025 0.215 0.032 
0.25 0.293 0.012 0.147 0.014 0.147 0.014 0.292 0.014 0.170 0.021 0.122 0.023 0.311 0.015 0.163 0.025 0.148 0.027 
0.5 0.256 0.011 0.168 0.012 0.088 0.011 0.238 0.012 0.174 0.014 0.064 0.014 0.304 0.023 0.198 0.022 0.106 0.021 
0.75 0.264 0.018 0.218 0.017 0.046 0.018 0.223 0.016 0.199 0.019 0.024 0.020 0.354 0.032 0.290 0.027 0.065 0.024 
0.9 0.271 0.018 0.265 0.023 0.007 0.032 0.206 0.026 0.217 0.028 -0.011 0.029 0.369 0.036 0.351 0.026 0.018 0.040 
2000                   
0.1 0.334 0.018 0.147 0.020 0.187 0.027 0.339 0.023 0.183 0.031 0.156 0.041 0.344 0.028 0.173 0.036 0.171 0.048 
0.25 0.275 0.013 0.143 0.013 0.131 0.016 0.271 0.016 0.144 0.017 0.127 0.021 0.294 0.018 0.167 0.027 0.127 0.033 
0.5 0.233 0.014 0.162 0.011 0.071 0.014 0.215 0.018 0.142 0.020 0.074 0.019 0.274 0.018 0.195 0.020 0.079 0.019 
0.75 0.249 0.016 0.214 0.012 0.035 0.019 0.229 0.031 0.183 0.032 0.046 0.027 0.297 0.021 0.238 0.029 0.059 0.024 
0.9 0.232 0.024 0.206 0.028 0.027 0.034 0.229 0.038 0.235 0.051 -0.006 0.046 0.280 0.035 0.245 0.040 0.035 0.048 
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2002                   
0.1 0.312 0.017 0.174 0.029 0.138 0.035 0.304 0.019 0.133 0.018 0.170 0.027 0.351 0.033 0.251 0.046 0.099 0.055 
0.25 0.265 0.012 0.178 0.018 0.087 0.019 0.234 0.018 0.151 0.016 0.083 0.023 0.315 0.017 0.222 0.026 0.093 0.035 
Table A3 - Continued 
0.5 0.245 0.013 0.190 0.018 0.055 0.015 0.213 0.016 0.171 0.014 0.042 0.017 0.303 0.018 0.232 0.024 0.071 0.020 
0.75 0.278 0.018 0.267 0.019 0.011 0.015 0.231 0.023 0.226 0.021 0.006 0.019 0.354 0.027 0.307 0.022 0.047 0.018 
0.9 0.290 0.026 0.304 0.022 -0.014 0.026 0.224 0.034 0.274 0.030 -0.050 0.034 0.396 0.033 0.355 0.025 0.041 0.030 
                   
2004                   
0.1 0.323 0.015 0.191 0.022 0.132 0.024 0.313 0.021 0.173 0.039 0.139 0.046 0.350 0.018 0.195 0.035 0.155 0.038 
0.25 0.273 0.010 0.176 0.016 0.097 0.017 0.271 0.014 0.157 0.029 0.114 0.030 0.300 0.013 0.202 0.023 0.098 0.022 
0.5 0.269 0.014 0.193 0.016 0.076 0.014 0.234 0.014 0.144 0.019 0.091 0.016 0.319 0.022 0.243 0.019 0.077 0.020 
0.75 0.297 0.019 0.249 0.021 0.047 0.017 0.260 0.023 0.221 0.021 0.039 0.019 0.364 0.026 0.305 0.030 0.058 0.026 
0.9 0.294 0.028 0.272 0.030 0.023 0.020 0.261 0.027 0.252 0.034 0.009 0.030 0.359 0.036 0.329 0.037 0.030 0.034 
2006                   
0.1 0.303 0.018 0.211 0.038 0.092 0.043 0.256 0.029 0.256 0.073 0.000 0.089 0.354 0.024 0.178 0.024 0.176 0.032 
0.25 0.262 0.013 0.201 0.026 0.061 0.023 0.243 0.012 0.218 0.033 0.025 0.036 0.310 0.013 0.217 0.020 0.093 0.016 
0.5 0.269 0.015 0.223 0.020 0.046 0.017 0.230 0.013 0.204 0.026 0.026 0.024 0.336 0.017 0.255 0.018 0.081 0.020 
0.75 0.320 0.013 0.286 0.018 0.034 0.016 0.270 0.030 0.270 0.031 0.000 0.020 0.397 0.018 0.318 0.026 0.079 0.028 
0.9 0.339 0.020 0.313 0.017 0.026 0.018 0.318 0.036 0.349 0.033 -0.030 0.023 0.396 0.034 0.306 0.039 0.090 0.039 
2008                   
0.1 0.316 0.016 0.195 0.018 0.120 0.024 0.272 0.023 0.222 0.022 0.050 0.033 0.366 0.018 0.184 0.028 0.182 0.031 
0.25 0.277 0.011 0.198 0.015 0.079 0.016 0.247 0.018 0.217 0.020 0.030 0.024 0.328 0.011 0.190 0.019 0.137 0.018 
0.5 0.272 0.013 0.218 0.018 0.054 0.016 0.250 0.016 0.226 0.023 0.024 0.019 0.322 0.015 0.222 0.022 0.100 0.018 
0.75 0.333 0.023 0.306 0.022 0.027 0.016 0.307 0.030 0.293 0.033 0.014 0.016 0.391 0.023 0.326 0.035 0.065 0.020 
0.9 0.389 0.025 0.396 0.023 -0.007 0.021 0.388 0.044 0.389 0.037 -0.001 0.027 0.443 0.036 0.413 0.033 0.030 0.032 
2010                   
0.1 0.335 0.014 0.208 0.019 0.127 0.022 0.310 0.017 0.191 0.041 0.120 0.041 0.374 0.024 0.216 0.027 0.158 0.036 
0.25 0.277 0.009 0.204 0.017 0.073 0.015 0.259 0.015 0.195 0.027 0.064 0.025 0.317 0.016 0.219 0.020 0.098 0.019 
0.5 0.275 0.013 0.234 0.017 0.041 0.012 0.252 0.017 0.228 0.022 0.025 0.022 0.322 0.021 0.261 0.018 0.061 0.014 
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0.75 0.321 0.016 0.307 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.304 0.025 0.298 0.021 0.006 0.019 0.366 0.021 0.333 0.020 0.032 0.019 
0.9 0.346 0.020 0.374 0.020 -0.028 0.022 0.317 0.034 0.334 0.023 -0.017 0.028 0.402 0.032 0.428 0.030 -0.026 0.029 
Note: Estimates obtained with the Stata command ‘cdeco’ to estimate unconditional and countefactual distributions using quantile regression results. 
Counterfactual distributions are obtained by estimating 50 conditional quantile regressions. Standard errors are bootstrapped (20 replications). See Table A2 for 
details about the specification of the model. 
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